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Abstract
Background: Victoria was the first state in Australia to experience community transmission of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. We
undertook a descriptive epidemiological analysis of the first 1,000 notified cases to describe the epidemic associated with
school children and explore implications for school closure and antiviral distribution policy in revised pandemic plans.
Methods: Records of the first 1,000 laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 notified to the Victorian
Government Department of Health between 20 May and 5 June 2009 were extracted from the state’s notifiable infectious
diseases database. Descriptive analyses were conducted on case demographics, symptoms, case treatment, prophylaxis of
contacts and distribution of cases in schools.
Results: Two-thirds of the first 1,000 cases were school-aged (5–17 years) with cases in 203 schools, particularly along the
north and western peripheries of the metropolitan area. Cases in one school accounted for nearly 8% of all cases but the
school was not closed until nine days after symptom onset of the first identified case. Amongst all cases, cough (85%) was
the most commonly reported symptom followed by fever (68%) although this was significantly higher in primary school
children (76%). The risk of hospitalisation was 2%. The median time between illness onset and notification of laboratory
confirmation was four days, with only 10% of cases notified within two days of onset and thus eligible for oseltamivir
treatment. Nearly 6,000 contacts were followed up for prophylaxis.
Conclusions: With a generally mild clinical course and widespread transmission before its detection, limited and short-term
school closures appeared to have minimal impact on influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 transmission. Antiviral treatment could rarely
be delivered to cases within 48 hours of symptom onset. These scenarios and lessons learned from them need to be
incorporated into revisions of pandemic plans.
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Introduction
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was identified in Mexico and the
United States (US) in April 2009 [1]. It spread rapidly around the
globe and by 12 May cases had been reported in 30 countries,
including Australia’s first case in the state of Queensland on 9 May
[2,3]. The second Australian case was reported in Victoria eleven
days later [4], after which notifications of confirmed cases in
Victoria accelerated much more rapidly than in other states and
territories [5]. The vast majority of these cases occurred in
metropolitan area of the state capital Melbourne. By early June
there were over 1,000 cases in Victoria [6], more than all the other
Australian states combined. This lead to Melbourne being referred
to in some popular media outlets as the ‘‘swine flu capital of the
world’’ [7].
Australia’s response to influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was un-
dertaken in accordance with the phases described in the Australian
Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (AHMPPI) [8],
which was shifted from Delay to Contain on 22 May in response to
evidence of local transmission in Victoria [3]. During the Delay and
Contain phases testing was recommended for all suspected cases in
the community. As the number of notified cases in Victoria
increased, investigation of all suspected cases became unsustain-
able and Victoria announced its move to a Modified Sustain phase
on 3 June; other jurisdictions remained in Contain [4]. Following an
announcement by the Australian Government on 17 June, all
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Australian jurisdictions subsequently moved to a new Protect phase
[3], with Victoria implementing this phase on 23 June. Testing
during Modified Sustain and Protect was generally focussed on those
most at risk of moderate to severe illness (including those with
certain chronic medical conditions or obesity, Indigenous
Australians, pregnant women, young children and infants and
health care workers) and those presenting with moderate to severe
disease [3,4].
School closure and distribution of antiviral medication are
important components of the recommended response to pandemic
influenza and both strategies were implemented in Victoria [9].
We reviewed the epidemiological data of the first 1,000 notified
cases of confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Victoria to gain
further insights into viral transmission among school children and
the implications of this transmission on administration of
oseltamivir for treatment and prophylaxis and for school closures.
Insights from this study can inform revised pandemic plans.
Methods
Laboratory confirmed influenza is a scheduled Group B
notifiable disease under the Victorian Health (Infectious Diseases)
Regulations 2001. Medical practitioners and pathology services
are required to notify cases, including prescribed demographic,
illness and outcome fields, to the Victorian Government De-
partment of Health (the department) in writing within five days of
diagnosis.
All confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases notified during
the Delay and Contain phases were investigated and demographic
and illness data were collected. Data on school attended were also
collected for cases aged from five to 17 years inclusive. Attempts
were made to identify all close contacts of confirmed cases –
defined as within one metre of the confirmed case (while infectious)
for more than 15 minutes or in the same room as a confirmed case
for more than four hours – for provision of prophylaxis and/or
quarantine advice as indicated.
During the Delay and Contain phases, testing for influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 at the state reference laboratory was authorised
by the department for all suspected cases, defined as a person with
fever and recent onset of at least one of rhinorrhoea, nasal
congestion, sore throat or cough. A case was confirmed if influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 was detected by polymerase chain reaction.
All case data were entered into the department’s Notifiable
Infectious Diseases Surveillance (NIDS) database. Records of the
first 1,000 notified cases of confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09
cases were extracted from the NIDS database and analysed
descriptively with Microsoft Excel software. Using Stata (Version
10.0) statistical software, the x2 and Fisher’s exact tests were used
to compare proportions, and the Mann-Whitney U test to
compare time between diagnostic events and the number of
contacts per case. A p value of less than 0.05 was considered
significant. Mapping was undertaken with ArcGIS software.
Ethics Statement
Approval from the Victorian Government Department of
Health Human Research Ethics Committee was not required for
this study because data were collected as part of regulated
notifiable disease surveillance. Influenza (laboratory confirmed) is
a scheduled notifiable disease in Victoria and notification of all
cases and prescribed data fields to the Department of Health is
mandatory under the Health (Infectious Diseases) Regulations
2001. Written consent from patients is not required for notification
of a notifiable infectious disease. Data in the study were used and
reported within the requirements of the Victorian Health Records
Act 2001.
Results
The initial detection of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Victoria
has been described in detail elsewhere [10,11]. Briefly, the first
case was confirmed on 20 May and increased to a peak of more
than 250 cases on 2 June; the 1,000th case was confirmed on 5
June. Only eight (0.8%) of the first 1,000 notified cases had
a reported history of travel to an area affected by influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09. Ages of cases ranged from five months to 79
years with a median of 15 years. The modal five-year age groups
were 10–14 and 15–19 years (figure 1).
Unspecified symptoms were reported for 14 cases and ‘‘flu-like
symptoms’’ reported for 25 cases. An illness onset date was
nominated for 389 cases but no symptoms were reported. Data
about specific symptoms were available for 520 cases (52%) and
are shown in table 1. Cough was the most commonly reported
symptom (85% of cases) followed by fever (68%), runny nose (66%)
and sore throat (62%). There was no statistically significant
difference in the percentage of cases with reported symptoms when
stratified by age groups of less than school age (,5 years), primary
school age (5–11 years), secondary school age (12–17 years) and
adults ($18 years). However, when comparing primary and
secondary school-aged children, a significantly higher percentage
of primary school children reported fever (76% to 64%; p= 0.02).
Twenty-two cases (2%) were reported to have been hospitalised;
eight (1%) of the 707 cases in children (aged less than 18 years)
were hospitalised. No deaths were reported. Among the
hospitalised children, six (75%) had reported risk factors including
asthma (two cases) and one case each with diabetes, pulmonary
disease, hypertension and muscular dystrophy.
Epidemiology in Schools
Children of school age (5–17 years) accounted for 668 of the
first 1,000 confirmed cases, for whom data on primary or
secondary school attended were available for 599 (90%). Data
were also available for three students aged 18 years and six
teachers, representing 203 schools. Among the remaining 69
school-aged children, school attended was unknown for 63, two
were in higher education institutions, two had not started school,
one was not at school and the other was an overseas visitor.
One school accounted for 77 confirmed cases and six schools
(3%) had between 10 and 25 cases. The remaining schools had less
than ten notified cases each, of which most (145 schools, 74%) had
two or fewer cases. The school with the largest number of
confirmed cases was a selective school with no geographic
enrolment restrictions, and the 77 cases’ residences represented
26 of Melbourne’s 30 metropolitan local government areas.
In general, cases appeared first in schools along the northern
corridor of the metropolitan area and then became established in
outer northern and western suburbs at the same time as a cluster
in the inner eastern suburbs (figure 2). Relatively few schools in the
eastern suburbs were affected until 3 June. The lower number of
cases in the final panel reflects the delay between disease onset and
notification, and end of the detailed follow-up of the first 1,000
cases.
An epidemic curve by age group for the school with 77 cases
(‘‘School A’’) showed a predominance of cases in 14–15 year-olds
in the first half of the 11-day period with an increasing proportion
of 16–17 year-olds in the second half (figure 3). School A was
closed for the week commencing 1 June, nine days after symptom
onset in the first case.
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in School Children
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The median time between illness onset and notification of
laboratory confirmation among school children was four days
(interquartile range [IQR]: 3–6) (figure 4). The median time from
illness onset to medical practitioner presentation and specimen
collection was two days (IQR: 1–3), as was specimen collection to
confirmatory laboratory result, following which the Department of
Health was notified within 12 hours.
Treatment and Prophylaxis
Treatment data were available for 897 cases (90%) of whom 206
(23%) were prescribed treatment doses of oseltamivir. The
proportion of the 691 cases (77%) who did not receive oseltamivir,
was significantly higher among school-aged children (80%)
compared to adults (73%) and those less than school age (62%)
(p = 0.009). Most cases (666/691, 96%) who did not receive
oseltamivir were not eligible because more than 48 hours had
elapsed since symptom onset. For the remaining 25 cases, the
reason was not stated for 14, five were pregnant, alternate
treatments were prescribed for four, one declined treatment, it was
contraindicated in another and one was unable to source
oseltamivir.
Of the 666 cases ineligible for oseltamivir treatment because
more than 48 hours had elapsed since symptom onset, 253 (38%)
had a specimen collected within one day of symptom onset.
Figure 1. Confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases and rate per 100,000 population by age group, Victoria, 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057265.g001
Table 1. Reported symptoms for 520 of first 1,000 confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases with data by age group and order of
case notification, Victoria, 2009.
Age group (years) Order of case notification
Symptom ,5 5–11 12–17 $18 p value First 100 Next 900 p value Total (%)
Cough 16 (76) 106 (85) 178 (86) 143 (86) 0.68 58 (78) 385 (86) 0.08 443 (85)
Fever 13 (62) 95 (76) 133 (64) 111 (67) 0.13 49 (66) 303 (68) 0.77 352 (68)
Runny nose 16 (76) 82 (66) 143 (69) 103 (62) 0.42 40 (54) 304 (68) 0.02 344 (66)
Sore throat 9 (43) 72 (58) 140 (67) 99 (60) 0.07 35 (47) 285 (64) 0.007 320 (62)
Fatigue 5 (24) 45 (36) 62 (30) 62 (37) 0.31 10 (14) 164 (37) ,0.001 174 (33)
Vomiting 3 (14) 17 (14) 20 (10) 16 (10) 0.61 4 (5) 52 (12) 0.15 56 (11)
Diarrhoea 1 (5) 13 (10) 13 (6) 14 (8) 0.53 0 41 (9) 0.002 41 (8)
Total with symptoms reported 21 125 208 166 74 446 520
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057265.t001
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Laboratory confirmation was made within one day of specimen
collection for 182 (27%) cases and within two days for 417 (63%).
Only 69 (10%) of the 666 cases were notified within two days of
onset.
Follow-up of cases identified 5,825 eligible contacts to whom
oseltamivir prophylaxis doses were distributed. Contacts were not
identified for 71 (7%) cases. The number of contacts per case was
significantly higher for school-aged children (median = 4, IQR: 3–
7) compared to adults (median= 4, IQR: 2–6) (p,0.0001).
Comparison between the First 100 and Next 900 Cases
Due to the increasing workload associated with the rapid rise in
notifications, follow-up of cases was by necessity less complete as
the epidemic evolved. We therefore compared the first 100 cases to
the following 900 to determine if the different approach to follow-
up resulted in any substantial differences in outcome.
Symptoms were reported for 74% of the first 100 cases
compared to 50% of the following 900 (p,0.001). However, with
the exception of fever which was similar for both groups, specific
symptoms were reported for a lower proportion of the first 100
cases (table 1). A non-significantly lower proportion of the next
900 cases were hospitalised (2.1% versus 3.0%) (p= 0.57). No
difference between the two groups was observed for the time from
onset to specimen collection (p= 0.91) but it took longer for the
group of 900 cases to be diagnosed following specimen collection
(median = 2 days, IQR: 1–3 versus median= 1 day, IQR: 1–2)
(p,0.0001). A significantly higher number of contacts for the first
100 cases (median= 10, IQR: 6–21) were followed up compared
to the following 900 (median= 4, IQR: 3–6) (p,0.0001). The
median number of contacts per school-aged child was 12 (IQR: 7–
31) and nine (IQR: 6–12) for adults who comprised the first 100
cases, but was four (IQR: 3–6) for school-aged children and three
(IQR: 2–5) for adults in the group of 900 cases.
Discussion
Comprising two-thirds of the first 1,000 notified cases, this study
is consistent with a review of serological studies that estimated
a higher cumulative incidence of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09
infection (prior to the initiation of population-based vaccination
against the pandemic strain) in school-aged children of 24–43%
compared to pre-school-aged children (16–28%), young adults
(12–15%) and older adults (2–3%) [12]. Further evidence of the
pivotal role of school-aged children in the spread of influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 was demonstrated in this study by transmission
within and from School A, which alone accounted for 8% of the
first 1,000 notified cases. The school drew its student population
from across the Melbourne metropolitan area, enabling wide
geographic dissemination of cases. Rapid transmission had
occurred through all the school’s year levels before cases were
recognised and student interactions restricted by school closure.
Transmission was also likely facilitated by the generally mild
clinical presentation, as evidenced by 32% of notified cases
Figure 2. Confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases aged 5–17 years by school and date of onset, Victoria, 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057265.g002
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Figure 3. Confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases at School A by date of onset and age group, Victoria, 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057265.g003
Figure 4. Confirmed influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases aged 5–17 years by days from onset to specimen collection and test result,
Victoria, 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057265.g004
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without a reported fever and only 2% being hospitalised,
consistent with findings from elsewhere around the globe
[13,14]. Detection of the local epidemic was probably further
delayed by the initial case definition criterion for testing of recent
overseas travel. Thus, many – presumably infectious – cases were
probably not tested, or even saw a clinician, for their illnesses. This
hypothesis is supported by modelling which suggested community
transmission of the pandemic virus was most likely established in
Victoria by late April and was certainly established by the time of
its detection [15]. Although the case definition for departmentally
authorised testing of suspected influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 cases
required a fever, nearly one third of the cases were sampled for
influenza testing without a fever. The reason for this is unclear, but
given these cases had at least one other reported symptom suggests
that other clinical criteria for testing were being recognised by
clinicians.
School closure is a commonly suggested mitigation measure for
influenza pandemics and the pandemic plans of Australia and
Victoria provided for this contingency [8,16]. Closure of schools to
control influenza epidemics and pandemics has been used to
varying effect, with timing of the closure(s) – as well as trigger,
extent and length – of crucial importance for the intervention’s
effectiveness [17]. Modelling using US [18,19] and Australian
[20,21] populations has suggested school closure can be effective at
reducing the final attack rate (cumulative incidence) of influenza
but the magnitude of the reduction is highly variable. This
variation is likely due to assumptions about differential attack rates
in adults and children, the extent of mixing and contact outside
school, and the number of symptomatic cases before closure is
implemented [21].
In general though, school closure is modelled to be most
effective if schools are closed early and remain closed until
prevalence returns to low levels and children and teenagers stay at
home during closure. There is evidence that closure of
kindergartens and schools in Hong Kong for up to one month
prior to the commencement of the 2009 summer vacation was
effective in the mitigation of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, with an
estimated 70% reduction in intra-age transmission concurrent
with school closures [22]. Furthermore, a study in two commu-
nities in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas indicated that reported rates of
respiratory illness were lower in a community which closed its
schools for eight consecutive days compared to another commu-
nity in which no schools were closed [23]. However, closure was
implemented early when influenza activity was low.
The approach to school closure in Victoria applied to specific
schools and classrooms in which two or more confirmed cases had
been identified, for the duration of one week. With the exception
of isolation for confirmed cases there were no restrictions of
student movements. Our study has confirmed the need for a pre-
emptive decision on school closure as indicated by theory and
practice; in Victoria too few schools were closed too late and for
too short a period to have had any discernible impact on the
impact of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 transmission. Specifically in
School A the delay between disease onset and notification meant
transmission in the school was already well established before the
need to close it was identified.
The rapid emergence of affected schools and modelling that
estimated establishment of community transmission in Victoria
around late April [11,15] suggested influenza A(H1N1)pdm09
prevalence was high by the time it was detected, and probably too
late for widespread school closure to be effective. Whilst pre-
emptive, widespread and extended school closure is anticipated to
effectively interrupt the transmission of pandemic influenza, it
raises concerns about expected compliance with social restrictions,
workforce shortages and economic impacts. A study of Victorian
households affected by school and classroom closures found 90%
of households understood what they were meant to do in the
quarantine period [24] and 85% complied with the requirement to
stay at home [25]. However, these households were only affected
by closures of up to one week and this contrasts with a study
among families in Western Australia, which found that school
closures caused considerable disruption for families in arranging
childcare and poor compliance among those placed in home
quarantine [26].
Whilst more than 6,000 treatment and prophylactic doses of
oseltamivir associated with the first 1,000 notified cases were
distributed to cases and contacts, antiviral treatment could rarely
be delivered to cases or their close contacts within 48 hours of
symptom onset. It is likely that much of this distribution
inefficiency was a consequence of its centralised nature and delays
associated with notification. However this centralised system
during the Contain phase was considered necessary as access to
oseltamivir from the National Medical Stockpile was conditional
on laboratory confirmation of cases.
Several limitations were associated with the methods of case
identification and data collection in this study. The presence of
symptoms as a criterion for testing meant that those with
subclinical infections were not represented, and although only
52% of first 1,000 cases had recorded symptoms, that a further
39% of cases had a reported illness onset date suggests that most of
remainder were missing data. Data quality and the capacity of case
investigation officers to follow up cases completely and undertake
contact tracing is likely to have progressively diminished as the
number of notified cases increased. This suggestion is supported by
the difference in reported symptoms and higher median number of
contacts followed up per case for the first 100 notified cases
compared to the following 900 cases.
Many countries are now reflecting on their 2009 pandemic
experiences and responses to review and revise their pandemic
plans. Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 had a generally mild clinical
course resulting in apparent widespread dissemination in Victorian
school children prior to its detection, meaning that school closure,
particularly short-term and isolated closures, were of little or no
benefit as a mitigation measure. Pandemic plans need to be refined
and flexible to incorporate such scenarios. Indeed, depending on
the perceived pandemic severity, it may be better to keep schools
open and waive the requirement for laboratory confirmation
earlier and to treat clinically compatible children cases, or
recommend nothing more than standard respiratory precautions
for those exhibiting symptoms. Furthermore, in the wake of this
experience consideration should be given to a decentralised, or
direct clinician access to the Australia’s National Medical
Stockpile, model of antiviral distribution during the early phases
of a pandemic. Certainly it is important to include the
ramifications of observations from this study in revised pandemic
plans.
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